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I .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Notwithstanding plaintiff's current focus on Price
Waterhouse's partnership selection process and on the absence

of affirmative action to root out of that process the
"possible" influence of a phenomenon the presence of which was

evidenced only by the speculative testimony of an "e pert,"
this remains a case of alleged disparate treatment. The core

llegation is that one or more of the partners who criticized

plaintiff's rude and offensive behavior did so in more intense
terms than they applied to such behavior in males. That the
stimulus for this alleged differential treatment may have been
a social scientific phenomenon does not alter the nature of

this claim or its analysis. Plaintiff's claim is simply that
one or more of her evaluators treated her differently because

of her sex than he treated similarly situated males. That was
the contention before the district court.

Plaintiff failed to establish that any partner treated
her differently than a male would have been treated. / / She
does not dispute this. Nor could she, as even the district

court in its confusing discourse on liability observed that
there was no proof that any partner evaluated plaintiff somehow

differently than he had evaluated male candidates.

1/ Plaintiff had the full and unfettered capacity to attempt
to prove at trial that one or more partners involved in the
disposition of her candidacy engaged in disparate treatment.

During discovery, all of the partners who criticized
plaintiff's interpersonal behavior were identified and were
available for deposition. The comments, criticisms and ratings

of these partners concerning plaintiff as well as the other
partnership candidates between 1981 and 1984 were supplied to
plaintiff. Plaintiff had full opportunity to explore in
discovery or at trial whether those partners critical of her
behavior reacted in the same fashion to similar behaviors by
male candidates. Moreover, plaintiff had ample opportunity to
explore with each partner the reasons or basis for his
criticisms of her or about any other candidate. Plaintiff did
none of the above.
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Plaintiff acknowledges the absence of any finding of
disparate treatment y any specific partner but argues that
. unnecessary to the ultimate liability determination,

this is

plaintiff and the district court's decision appear to contend
that because Price Waterhouse failed to include in its
selection process safeguards against the crediting of
criticisms that may "possibly" have been unconsciously
overstated, it was appropriate to place upon Price Waterhouse
the burden of proving that overstatement did not in fact occur
or influence the decision. That is, because the firm did not
"discrimination-proof" its process, it had the burden to prove

that partners participating in it did not engage in disparate
treatment. Alternatively, plaintiff and the district court
see to feel that because she could not prove that any
partner's alleged overstatement of his criticism caused the

decision to hold her candidacy, she should not be expected or
required to prove that any partner's criticism involved such
disparate treatment. Price Waterhouse submits that neither of
these excuses for the absence of a finding of disparate
treatment can justify the decision.

Beyond the attempt to excuse the gap in the district
court's decision, plaintiff's reply brief mounts several
diversionary efforts. A ong other things, plaintiff makes a
half-hearted effort to reargue her theories of liability that
were specifically rejected by the district court. She does
this not to convince this Court that the rejection of these
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claims was clearly erroneous but as a means of allowing her to

mischaracterize the subsidiary factual findings made by the
district court in dismissing these claims. This sleight of
ha d is attempted because plaintiff recognizes that those
adverse findings conflict or cannot be reconciled with the
court's ultimate liability determination. Price Waterhouse
addresses plaintiff's attempt to obfuscate.

Plaintiff also fails to explain how the district court
could find intentional discrimination and at the same time find
that no person intended to discriminate. She attempts to

explain away this contradiction by reference to theories of
liability in sexual harassment cases. As set forth below,

those authorities do not support the proposition that
intentional discrimination can be found where no one has
intended to adversely tre t a female.

Price Waterhouse also takes issue with plaintiff's
effort to convince this Court that a reference to grooming and
appearance by plaintiff's strongest supporter can somehow
constitute the cornerstone for a finding that other partners

who reacted negatively to plaintiff's interpersonal behavior
engaged in disparate treatment. Plaintiff errs in suggesting
that any difference in grooming or appearance standards for
males and females violates Title VII.
Finally, plaintiff's reply brief argues that the
aPpeal of Price Waterhouse ignores Rule 52 and the decision of
the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Bessemer City,

U.S.

,

105 S. Ct. 1504 (1985). This is not so. Indeed, plaintiff's
argument seeks to create the impression that the appeal of
Price Waterhouse attempts to reargue the evidence. As the

firm's initial brief makes clear, the firm's appeal is directed
to the absence of a finding of disparate treatment, the absence
of any evidence to support the liability determination, and the
erroneous application of the law respecting the allocations of
the burdens of production and persuasion, the proof of intent,
and the proof of causation in disparate treatment cases.

II.

CONTRARY TO PLAINTIFF S ARGUMENTS, THE DISTRICT
COURT'S FINDING THAT IT COULD NOT HOLD THAT ANY
PARTNER ENGAGED IN DISPARATE TREATMENT DOES RENDER
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ULTIMATE LIABILITY
FINDING CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Price Waterhouse's opening brief argued this common

sense proposition: Since plaintiff alleged disparate treatment
by one or more members of an identified group of
partner-evaluators and since the district court determined that

plaintiff failed to prove that any of these possible
discriminators in fact engaged in disparate treatment, the

finding of liability under the disparate treatment theory was
clearly erroneous. That is, where a plaintiff alleges

disparate treatment in the nature of being judged more harshly
for engaging in a particular type of behavior, plaintiff must
demonstrate that one or more persons in fact judged the
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plaintiff more harshly than they judged or would have judged
members of the majority group engaging in the same behavior,
laintiff's brief ackno ledges the absence of any such finding
but argues it is unnecessary to sustain ul-timate liability.
None of her arguments is persuasive and none has any support in

the law of Title VII.

A. Liability For Disparate Treatment Is ot Established By
Simply Raising The Possibility That Evaluators May Have
Treated A Plaintiff Differently And That The Employer
Should Have Been ware Of And Recognized This Possibility.
Plaintiff argues that it was unnecessary for the court

to find that any evaluating partner in fact judged her more
harshly than similarly situated males. In essence, plaintiff
contends she carried her burden of proof of disparate treatment

by 1) supposedly demonstrating that the partnership selection
process was not altered to preclude the possibility of adverse
differential treatment of females; 2) offering testimony of a
social scientist who indicated that she was suspicious that
differential treatment occurred because different partners
expressed in different words their own particular observations

of plaintiff's interpersonal behaviors; and 3) by her lawyers'
post-trial arg ment that the firm should previo sly have been
alert to the possibility noted by the expert that one or ore
partners may have engaged in disparate treatment. This,

plaintiff argues, sufficed to shift the burden of proof to
Price Waterhouse to prove that none of the evaluating partners
in fact engaged in disparate treatment. This argument misreads
the law of Title VII.

6

It is settled law that an employer is not liable for
disparate treatment in a promotion decision simply because it
maintains a selection process that credits evaluations that
could be affected by disparate treatment on the part of an
evaluator. Conversely, an employer may be liable where it

maintains a tightly structured system designed to foreclose
disparate treatment but an evaluator submits an evaluation

influenced by disparate treatment which causes an adverse
personnel decision. The law is clear that, apart from whether

it is dispositive, the fact of differential adverse treatment
is at least a necessary predicate for a finding of liability.
The plaintiff ade no such showing in this case.
There are several methods by which

Title VII

plaintiff might prove that an evaluator applied impermissibly
different standards to judge the behavior of male and female
employees. First, plaintiff could have presented a documentary
comparison of the partner's written evaluations of male and

female employees. Plaintiff undertook no such presentation at
trial, despite having received in discovery the full co plement
of written materials generated during the admissions processes

in 1982, 1983 and 1984 and all of the extant materials from
1981. Not only did plaintiff present no documentary evidence
of the application of a different standard by any partner, but
the only documentary evidence before the district court
established to the contrary. early every partner who
criticized plaintiff's interpersonal s ills registered the same
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In some instances, he partners

criticisms of male candidates,

used exactly the same words to describe plaintiff and a male
candidate.

Plaintiff could have deposed or called at trial the
partners who criticized her interpersonal skills in order to
explore whether they applied different standards to male and
female candidates. She had ample opportunity to do so, but
again chose not to present any comparison of any partner's
reactions to male and female candidates. Moreover, in the

single instance where plaintiff elected to challenge by way of
cross examination the derivation and appropriateness of a
partner's highly critical remarks about her, the court found
the com ents appropriate and free of discrimination.
In essence, plaintiff chose to go no further than to

have her expert point out the different words that different •
partners chose to describe her own rude and offensive
behavior. Such evidence is at most probative of whether

different people have different levels of tolerance for
offensive behavior. And even this assumes one could discern

differences in the strength of feeling behind a comment by
simply reading its words. It further assumes that plaintiff's
behavior was absolutely uniform with respect to every partner
and every professional staff member with whom she had contact.
Needless to say, such "laboratory" conditions did not exist.
Furthermore, the different comments concerning

plaintiff's interpersonal skills do not "starkly contrast" with
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each other as plaintiff and her expert contended. Plaintiff
as identified not even one partner who stated that plaintiff
was pleasant, personable, sensitive to others, or well-liked by

the members of her staff. Indeed, there is virtual unanimity
among supporters and detractors alike with respect to
plaintiff's considerable difficulties in the area of
interpersonal skills.
The only differences among the comments are ones of
word choice and perhaps degree of concern - such as the

difference between describing an individual as "hardcharging"
and describing that individual as "overbearing." The fact that
one partner, based on his contact with plaintiff, found her
hardcharging while another, based on a separate contact ith

plaintiff, found her overbearing, proves only that different
partners may have different levels of sensitivity to rude and
offensive behavior.

his comparison told the district court

nothing concerning whether the individual partners might have
characterized differently such behavior on the part of a ma .

When viewed in the proper light, the plaintiff's
theory of liability constitutes an abrupt departure from the
rules concerning burdens of production and persuasion carefully

developed by the Supreme Court in a series of Title VII
decisions. The theory adopted is by no means limited to the
ad issions process at a large accounting firm, however, and has
widespread implications. In essence, the theory creates a new

formulation in cases challenging adverse employment decisions
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with respect to which more t an one evaluator had input. The

plaintiff's burden of persuasion under this new formulation can
pe satisfied as follows: The plaintiff can merely show
(a) that she was criticized for interpersonal behavior;
(b) that the criticisms were not expressed in exactly the same
words by every evaluator; and (c) that the employer did not
ake affirmative steps to foreclose the possibility that
disparate treatment occurred.

At this point, then, the burden of proof shifts to the
employer. The employer under this formulation must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that none of the evaluators

applied a different standard of interpersonal behavior to male
employees. It is only at this point in the analysis that the
district court's approach would require any examination of the
evaluators' evaluations of male employees. Apparently the

plaintiff in such a case need only prove that she is female in
order to raise a suspicion of disparate treatment sufficient to

impose upon the employer the burden of disproving its existence.
This is an astonishing proposition since the
plaintiff's issue in such disparate treatment cases is

generally thought to be whether individual evaluators
themselves used differing standards in assessing the behavior
of male and female candidates. Under he theory of this case,

employers must defend all employ ent decisions involving
multiple evaluators where the written comments of the
evaluators differ semantically. This would be true even where

10

evaluators

spo

on diffsrsn

sxps xsnces with the

employ66- Indeed this would be true where it was established,

aS here, that the criticisms of the candidate were fair, just
and proper in substance and direction. Price Waterhouse

maintains that such a theory as to the allocation of the
burdens of production and persuasion is inconsistent with the
law of Title VII as interpreted by the Supreme Court in exas
ap't of Com . Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 2 8 (1981), and
therefore the district court s finding of liability must be
reversed.

B. The Fact That Plaintiff May Have Difficulty Demonstrating
That Any Partner's lleged Disparate Treatment Caused The

Hold Decision Does Not Excuse Plaintiff From Being Required
TcHProve That Such Disparate Treatment Occurred.

Plaintiff argues that the requirement of proof that
any individual evaluator engaged in disparate treatment should
be overlooked or excused in this case because it would have
been impossible, she claims, to determine whether any such

allegedly discriminating evaluator's comments caused the Policy
Board decision to hold her candidacy. In making this argument,

plaintiff accuses Price Waterhouse of "exploit[ing] the
collective n ture of the [admissions] process by arguing that
the decision to exclude plaintiff ca not be pinned on ny
particular man." (PI. Reply Br. 18.)

ccordingly, she asserts

that she need not explore any particular evaluator's judgment
or comments because she does not know which partners' opinions
carried the day.

Plaintiff has apparently missed the point.

Price

Waterhouse does not argue that the decision cannot be pinned on
a particular partner. In focussing on individual commentors,

rice Waterhouse simply makes the observation that plaintiff
has not established the alleged discrimination, i.e., the
application of a different standard, by even one partner.

Any exploitation that might be occurring here is
solely on the part of plaintiff. She has failed to show that
any partner applied a different standard, but argues that the
collective nature of the partnership process excuses her from

any obligation to do so. Instead, she argues that simply
pointing out semantic differences in different partners'
comments concerning her behavior is sufficient to place the
burden upon Price Waterhouse to prove that none of the more
negative comments was the result of an application of a

different standard to plaintiff's behavior because she is
female.

Plaintiff also relies upon a misstatement of the law
concerning proof of causation to support her argument that she

eed not prove that any partner engaged in disparate
treatment. Plaintiff arg es that the plaintiff's proof of
causation in these cases can be minimal and that she needed

only to demonstrate that the "hold" decision was "tainted" or
in some fashion "infected" with discrimination. From this
char cterization of the law co cerning causation, plaintiff
derives the conclusion that her proof of the fact of disparate
"

eatment may be similarly weak or nonexistent. This is
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boot-strapping. Even if the law were hat a plaintiff need
o ly establish a minimal causal connection between proven

disparate treatment and the ultimate decision being challenged,
that does not establish that she need not prove the
differential treatment or that her proof of such differential
treatment may be weak and obtuse. The fact is that this Court
should never reach the issue of the appropriate causation

standard since the fact of differential adverse treatment has
never been established and plaintiff acknowledges this. Even
if Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976), stands for
the proposition that plaintiff need not establish a "but for"
causal connection between adverse differential treatment and
the decision being challenged, it does not support the arg ment

that plaintiff need not demonstrate adverse differential
treatment./2/

2/ On the issue of causation, plaintiff argues that she cannot
be faulted if the evidence does not "precisely" demonstrate the
effect of any evaluations "tainted" by use of sexual

stereotypes, (PI. Reply Br. 21, 22), and that it is sufficient
if she proved that they "played a role" in the challenged
decision. (PI. Reply Br. 24.) It is defendant's burden,
plaintiff asserts, to show that those evaluations were not the
determinative factor. (PI. Reply Br. 24-26.)

Once again, plaintiff's statement of the law is based on
wishful thinking. It is well established that, to prove
unlawful discrimination, the plaintiff must prove that it was a
"determinative factor" that "made a difference" in the result.
E.g,, Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d at 179;
Cebula v. General Elec. Co., 614 F. Supp. 260, 267 (N.D. 111.
1985); see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S.

(Footnote continued)
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I

Plaintiff urges a theory that imposes liability
henever it is determined that 1) the possibility of sex

I

stereotyping is present in any given decision; 2) the employer
should have been alert to this possibility; and 3) the employer
has ot taken affirmative steps to root out any possible sex
stereotyping. Even if this theory were good law, what is
particularly troubling in this case is that liability has been
imposed because the court determined that the firm should have

been aware of the possibility of sex stereotyping. If the
unconscious sex stereotyping implications of comments could be

determined by the trial court only on the basis of so-called
expert testimony preferred at the rebuttal stage of trial, it
scarcely can be said that in 1983 and earlier these
implications or the prospect of this phenomenon's operation
should have been so evident to Policy Board members -- who are
accountants and the like, not social psychologists -- that they
should have taken action to "discourage" or "discard" those

(Footnote continued)
273, 282 n.10 (1976). Here the trial court could not and did
not find that the "tainted" evaluations "made a difference" in
the result, and that should have.been fatal to plaintiff's
claim of violation. Unable to say that impermissible sexual
stereotyping was the "but for" or "determinative" factor in the
Policy Board's hold decision, plaintiff and the trial court
vaguely assert that the decision was "infected" or "tainted."
(PI. Reply Br. 2 , 27.) But such rhetoric cannot obscure

Plaintiff's failure to establish the requisite degree of
ca sation.
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ill

omments reflecting stereotypes. This is particularly so in
view of the fact that neither the trial court nor the
plaintiff's expert could identify any specific comment that was
in fast influenced by disappointed sex stereotypes, whether
these stereotypes were impermissible or otherwise.

Ill.

PLAINTIFF'S REARGUING OF HER REJECTED THEORIES AND
HER MISCHARACTERIZATION OF THE COURT'S FINDINGS ON
THOSE THEORIES BETRAY THAT SHE ALSO VIEWS THE LIABILITY
DETERMINATION AS IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION ITH THOSE FINDINGS.
As Price Waterhouse observed in its opening brief, the
district court made findings rejecting plaintiff's first two
theories of liability that directly conflict with the court's
liability determination and the findings implicit thereunder.
Plaintiff does not address in her reply brief the obvious
contradictions and internal conflicts in the district court's
decision. Instead, plaintiff engages in an effort to recast or
mischaracterize

he findings adverse to her theories so as to

give the appearance that the contradictions do not exist. All

this suggests that even plaintiff cannot support the district
court's decision in light of these obvious internal
contradictions.

Plaintiff's brief is misleading as o several key
issues. Price Waterhouse therefore finds it necessary to

provide to this Court a comparison of the district court's
findings and plaintiff's distorted misstatements of those
findings.
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I

The Partners' Concerns About Plaintiff's Interpersonal
kills Were Not Fabricated, Overblown Or Overstated.

W ile professing to state only undisputed facts,
plaintiff represents in her brief that the evidence
demonstrates that negative comments about her interpersonal
shill2 "clearly were overblown" and "overstated." Plaintiff

then hedges this already rejected contention by
mischaracterizing the district court's finding on this point as
follows: "The court did not find that concerns about
plaintiff's interpersonal skills were entirely groundless."

This is a substantial misstatement of the district court's
unchallenged finding on this issue: "Plaintiff's conduct
provided a ple justification for the complaints that formed the
basis of the Policy Board's decision." (RE 15 (emphasis
added).)
More specifically the court found that the record
established that plaintiff was, among other things, rude,

insensitive, unduly harsh and difficult to work with.
Plaintiff has not appealled from these findings and therefore
cannot be heard here to dispute her seriously deficient

interpersonal skills nor to pass off criticism of her behavior
as "muted concerns." (PI. Reply Br. 28.) Plaintiff knows the

court's findings cannot be reconciled with the theory of
disparate treatment upon which the district court found
liability. Thus she seeks to obscure the conflict.
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B-

Plaintiff Failed To Prove That The Policy Board Would Have
Recommended For Admission A Similarly Situated Male
Candidate.

Plaintiff devotes several pages of her brief to
another equally unsuccessful argument - that interpersonal

s ills criticisms were "not fatal" for otherwise qualified
( ,e., similarly situated) male partnership candidates. This
argu ent is not appropriate in this context for two reasons.
First, her use here of the term "fatal" and her descriptions
elsewhere of the Policy Board as "excluding" or "rejecting" her
from partnership grossly mischaracterize the Policy Board's

decision. The Policy Board determined that plaintiff's
candidacy should be held at least a year so that she would be
"afford[ed] time to demonstrate that she ha[d] the personal and
leadership qualities required of a partner." (Def. Exh. 37.)

The Policy Board agreed to this "hold" decision despite the
fact that the comments received would have justified a final
determination that she should not be admitted. The "hold"
decision was by no means a death knell to plaintiff's
partnership prospects, especially in light of the fact that
most candidates who are placed on "hold" are admitted in a
subsequent year.

More importantly, though, plaintiff simply cannot
revive here old arguments that were considered and decisively
rejected by the district court. The district court considered
the same arguments set forth in her reply brief, and found that
'the firm . . . consistently placed a high premium on

17

candidates' ability to deal with staff and peers on an
terpersonal basis," and that male and female candidates were
"regularly held because of concerns about their interpersonal

s ills." (RE 19 (emphasis added).) Furthermore, after
reviewing the evidence concerning successful male candidates

alleged by plaintiff to be comparable, the court found that
"price Waterhouse had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

distinguishing between the plaintiff and the male partners with
whom she compares herself." (RE 18.) These findings have not
been challenged by way of appeal and therefore must stand.

IV.

PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF LIABILITY RESTS UPON THE INCORRECT
PREMISE THAT TITLE VII PROHIBITS ANY DIFFERENCE IN
GROOMING OR APPEARANCE STANDARDS APPLIED TO MALES AND FEMALES.
Even if one were to accept that plaintiff established
through competent evidence in this case that one or more

partners critical of plaintiff treated her differently in some
fashion than they treated similarly situated males, a liability
finding is not appropriate. Plaintiff's claim and the district
court's ruling both rest at bottom upon the premise that Title
VII prohibits an employer from making any decision based in
part upon "stereotypes" concerning how female and male

employees should look or act. Although plaintiff asserts that
this position reflects "familiar Title VII principles on
liability," (PI. Reply Br. 29), those principles are in fact to
the contrary.
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It is well established -- by the decisions of this
Court and other court of appeals ignored by plaintiff -- that
an employer can properly make decisions based on its notion of

jjqw it wants its employees to appear and behave, and that such
standards (or stereotypes) can be different for men and women
employees. E.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 E.2d 1205 (8th

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986); Bellissimo v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1244 (1986); Carroll v. Talman Fed. S. & L.
Ass1n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 445 U.S.

929 (1980); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d
1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488
F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fagan v. National Cash Register
Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Boyce v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1972). 3/

3/ In Fagan, Dodge, Willingham and Boyce the courts sustained
rules barring long hair on men but not women. Carroll ruled
that an employer could impose different dress requirements on
men and women but could not require only women to wear uniforms
on the offensive stereotypical premise that women could not be

e pected to exercise good judgment in choosing business
apparel, but men could. 604 F.2d at 1033 n.17. I

Bellissimo

the court found no violation where the plaintiff was a
"strident, touchy, and difficult employee" and her supervisor
had criticized her clothes as "too tight fitting, too 'flashy,'
and . . . not in keeping with the department's [unwritten]
policy of dressing in a conservative style" and also criticized
her for dancing with a male client at a bar and leaving with
him. 764 F.2d at 177, 181, 182. In Craft, the unsuccessful
Plaintiff had been lawfully removed as a television news anchor
after extensive comments on her apparel (her clothes were said
to be "too masculine"), including audience surveys showing

(Footnote continued)
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In general, such standards are regarded as matters of

"managerial responsibility," Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091;
Pa an, 81 F.2d at 1125, which raise issues that tend to be
"nonjusticiable" and not for the courts to resolve. Craft, 766

F.2d at 1215; Fagan, 81 F.2d at 1123; Boyce, 351 F. Supp. at
404. That is so whether the employer's standards reflect
"customary" business standards or social norms of the

community, Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1032; Willingham, 501 F.2d at
1087, or whether they be "out of touch" or aberrational.

Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215; Bellissimo, 764 F.2d at 182; Boyce,
351 F. Supp. at 404.

Title VII is implicated by such standards only where
they are intended to impose distinct disadvantages on one sex
based on sexual "amimus," Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215; Bellissimo,
764 F.2d at 181, or where they are "demeaning" or "offensive"'

stereotypes. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215 n.12; Carroll, 604 F.2d at
1033, tied to "immutable" characteristics or forces beyond the

control of employees of that sex, Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091;

(Footnote continued)
that she had a negative image relative to other anchor wome ,

and after unprecedented steps were taken with respect to
plaintiff alone to address the image problems. Male and female
anchors were subject to different "dos" and " on'ts," the
standards for males cautioning against "frivolous" colors and

styles damaging their "authority," and the females' standards
emphasizing "the female stereotype of 'softness,' and bows and

ruffles," and "fashionableness" and advising against "tight
sweaters or overly 'sexy' clothing." 766 F.2d

1214, 1215.

t 1208-09,

podge, 488 F.2d at 1336; Fagan, 81 F.2d at 1125, or where they
substantially interfere with the exercise of protected
"fundamental" rights. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091; Dodge, 488
E\2d at 1337. The use of sexual odels or stereotypes is not
prohibited where done in good faith and incidental to some
other legitimate purpose, such as a focus on the style of all
employees. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215. Where the line should be
drawn between permissible and impermissible use of sexual
stereotypes is often a question of degree. Dodge, 488 F.2d at
1336-37. As the district court observed in Boyce, while the
laws concerning sex discrimination are important, "[t]hey must

be realistically interpreted, or they will be ignored or
displaced. Ours should not be an effort to achieve a unisex
society." 351 F. Supp. at 404.

As for the application of these familiar Title VII
principles in this case, even assuming that plaintiff
established that Price Waterhouse partners held a stereotyped
expectation of how females should appear, plaintiff did not
prove and the court did not find any facts sufficient to
support the conclusion that sex stereotypes played an
impermissible role in the decision to place plaintiff on hold.
There was no evidence or finding that the firm used demeaning
or offensive stereotypes of women based on immutable

characteristics, or stereotypes that substantially impinged
uPo the exercise of protected fundamental rights. Nor was
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there any evidence or finding that stereotypes played a role
only with respect to female employees, and not male employees.

Plaintiff did not prove that she was appraised by any
particular partner in light of a stereotype that was offensive,
demeaning, or prejudicial to female candidates. Rather, she

claims in effect that one of her supporters opined she would
have fared better if she had been more "womanly," i.e., if she

ad fit better his model of how female employees should conduct
themselves. Thus, she was assertedly prejudiced not because
she was a woman, but because she was insufficiently a woman

(just as a male candidate might be prejudiced for being
insufficiently "manly").

The most that plaintiff can be said to have
established is that she was appraised by her supporters in
comparison with a model or stereotype that differed in some
particulars fro the model they used in appraising male
employees. But that is not a violation of Title VII./4/

4/ The limited application of Title VII in this area was
recognized in the article upon which the district court
relied. (RE 24 n.ll, 29 n.15.) Taub, Keeping Women in Their
Place: Stereotyping Per Se As A Form of Employment
Pi scrimination, 21 B.C.L. Rev. 345, 418 (1980). It would be
particularly unfair to impose liability upon Price Waterhouse
for actions taken not only on the basis of implications of
com ents that could be established only with the assistance of
an expert, and before it was clear that Title VII was even
applicable to the decision in question, see Bishopp v. District
°f Columbia, No. 85-5329 (D.C. Cir. April 18, 1986), slip op.
15 n.ll, but under an interpretation of Title VII that had not
V®t been endorsed by the courts.

V.

PLAINTIFF IS I CORRECT IN ASSERTING THAT PRICE WATERHOUSE
DID NOT ADDRESS RULE 52 AS INTERPRETED IN
ANDERSON v. BESSEMER CITY.

Plaintiff complains that defendant's brief did no
specifically mention Rule 52 or Anderson v. Bessemer City,

U.S. , 105 S. Ct. 1504 (1985), (PI. Reply Br. 2, 20),
overlooking defendant's reliance, (Def. Br. 25), upon this
Court's subsequent decision in Cuddy v. Carmen, 762 F.2d 119
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 597 (1985), which

discussed and applied both Rule 52 and Anderson. In Cuddy, the
Court made clear that a factual finding is "clearly erroneous"

if either it is "without substantial evidentiary support" or
"was induced by an erroneous application of the law." 762 F.2d

at 12 . Here, the findings of the trial court fail on both
grounds. Moreover, the court failed to make findings on key
issues./5/

5/ he principles governing application of the "clearly
erroneous" rule announced in Cuddy are not altered by this
Court's recent decision in Bishopp v. District of Columbia,

No. 85-5329 (D.C. Cir. April 18, 1986), upon which plaintiff
now relies. (PI. Reply Br. 16, 20.) In arguing that the trial
court erred insofar as it required proof that defendant
intentionally sought to force plaintiff to resign, (PI. Reply
Br. 33, 35), plaintiff conveniently overlooks the portion of
Bishopp addressing "constructive discharge," where the Court

reiterated the standard that "'[a] finding of constructive
discharge depends on whether the employer deliberately made
working conditions intolerable and drove the employee into "an
involuntary quit"' (citations omitted).
finding of
constructive discharge requires a finding of intentional
discrimination plus a finding of 'aggravating factors' that
suggest that the complainant was driven to quit." Slip op. at
18.
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As for the substantiality of the evidence, this is not
a case in which plaintiff's theory of liability rested upon the
fact-finder having credited the testimony of plaintiff's
witnesses rather than defendant's witnesses. To the contrary,

on the theories that turned on testimony of witnesses, the
court ruled for defendant./6/ Rather, plaintiff's differential
stereotype theory rested entirely upon facts not in dispute,
principally written statements made in the evaluation process.

6/ For example, after hearing testimony from plaintiff,
Mr. Beyer (the head of OGS), r. Epelbaum (plaintiff's critic
in OGS), and Mr. Connor (the head of the Policy Board), the
court specifically found (1) that plaintiff in fact had
substantial deficiencies in her interpersonal skills; (2) that
the Policy Board's reliance on such deficiencies in deciding to
"hold" plaintiff was not pretextual; (3) that defendant did not
intentionally discriminate against plaintiff by treating her
interpersonal deficiencies differently than it treated such
deficiencies in men; (4) that plaintiff's opponents in QGS were
not discriminatorily motivated; and (5) that, while it was
"unlikely" that plaintiff would be made a partner, defendant
had not made her working conditions intolerable nor treated her
in such a way as to leave her no reasonable option but to
resign.

Without attempting to show that any fact finding was
"clearly erroneous," plaintiff repeatedly makes assertions that
are inconsistent with the trial court's findings. For example,

plaintiff relies upon statistics, (PI. Reply Br. 13 n.5), which
the trial court rejected as being "wholly inconcl sive" and so
"fragile" that no conclusion could be dra n from t em.

(RE 20.) Similarly, plaintiff asserts that as a result of the
OGS decision not to recommend her for partner, her chances
" ere over," her opportunities "had ended," and she had "no
meaningful chance" or "no chance;" it was "the death knell to

[her] chances for partnership." (PI. Reply Br. 32, 34, 35, 36,
37.) She also repeatedly invokes the court's hyperbolic
co ent in colloquy at trial about waiting for lightning to
st ike. (PI. Br. 30, 33.) The court's findings and
conclusion, however, did not go so far as plaintiff asserts, in

that the court concluded only that it was "unlikely" that she
w°ulci become a partner. (RE 32.)
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In challenging the trial court's acceptance of that theory,
Price Waterhouse is not challenging a choice between "two
permissible views of the evidence," Anderson,

U.S. at

, 105 S. Ct. at 1512, but rather is contending that, on the
entirety of the record here, plaintiff's stereotype heory did
not constitute a "permissible view of the evidence" and that
acceptance of it was induced by erroneous application of the
law.

To be sure, plaintiff might have developed a record
which supported such a theory. For example, plaintiff might
have questioned those who made assertedly stereotype-based
comments, in an attempt to determine whether the negative
comments were in fact "overstated" or "overblown," (PI. Reply
Br. 8, 9), because plaintiff did not conform to the commentor's
stereotypes for female employees. Through such questioning
plaintiff might have "wrung out" any reliance on sexual
stereotypes and established whether, without them, "there would
have been fewer negative comments" and those that remained
negative "would have been less vehement." (PI. Reply Br. 28.)
On the present record, however, these indispensable elements of

plaintiff's case remain wholly matters of speculation without
an evidentiary foundation. That gap, moreover, could not

properly be filled by having such speculation offered by
plaintiff's e pert witness, rather than by plaintiff or her
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counsel, for reasons we have already noted, without meaningful
response by plaintiff. (Def. Br. 11 n.4, 29-32 and n.12)./7/

Similarly, plaintiff might have questioned the Policy
Board to establish whether "enough of the members. . . voted

against plaintiff because of" the assertedly tainted com ents,
Banerjee v. Board of Trustees, 648 F.2d 61, 65 (1st Cir.),

cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981),/8/ and what they would have
done if there had been fewer or less intense negative comments

about plaintiff. 9/ Had plaintiff built such a record, the

7/ Plaintiff has not even attempted to defend the trial
court's erroneous admission of the testimony of plaintiff's
so-called expert, who was predisposed to find sexual
stereotypes. That testimony went no further than to indicate
that commenters may have used sexual stereotypes; it did not
suggest that such stereotypes were used only as to women, or

that the stereotypes implicit in the comments were offensive or
demeaning to women.

8/ Plaintiff has simply ignored the requirement to prove that
a sufficient number of the members of a collegial body based
their decisions on impermissible factors. In analogous
circumstances the courts have held that evidence of statements

reflecting bias are not relevant or sufficient to prove a
violation unless made or endorsed by those who made the adverse
decision. E.g., Kumar v. Board of Trustees, 774 F.2d 1, 10,

19-21 (1st Cir. 1985); Stendebach v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 691 F.2d
735, 738 (5th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 944 (1983);
Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 37 FEP Cases 1510, 1518-19 (C.D.

Cal. 1985).
9/ Even if plaintiff had proven the Board's "hold" decision to
have been unlawfully affected by impermissible sex
stereotyping, she would have been entitled to no more than a
nullification of that action, i,e., to be reconsidered by the
Policy Board. Compare Darnell v. City of Jasper, 730 F.2d 653,

656 (11th Cir. 1984) (successful plaintiff entitled to t ke
test unlawfully denied, b t not to instatement to position);
( ootnote continued)

trial court might not have found it impossible to say whether
plaintiff "would have been elected partnership if the Policy
Board's decision had not been tainted by sexually biased
evaluations." (RE 31.) Having herself failed to make a record
below, plaintiff now is forced to argue that it was defendant's
burden to make such a record as a matter of remedy, rather than

her burden to do so in order to prove a violation and establish
liability. As we have shown, however, plaintiff has
misperceived the parties' burdens.

VI.

THE COURT IN A CASE INVOLVI G ALLEGED DISPARATE
TREATMENT MUST FIND AN INTENT TO DISCRIMINATE.
As plaintiff's reply reveals, the findings adverse to
plaintiff below make it infeasible for her to defend the
district court's decision as one which comports with usual or

familiar principles of Title VII liability. Based on findings
that plaintiff does not challenge and which cannot be called
"clearly erroneous," the district court rejected plaintiff s
claims that defend nt's evaluation or selection practices had a
"disparate impact" on plaintiff and other women because of

(Footnote continued)
Fields v. Clark Univ., 40 FEP Cases 670, 672 (D. Mass. 1986)
(successful plaintiff denied tenure to be rehired a d
reconsidered free of discrimination, because "plaintiff had not
proved on this record she is entitled to tenure," only that
denial was impermissibly affected by sexual discrimination).
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their sex (RE 30 n.16); that Price Waterhouse was guilty of
"disparate treatment" of plaintiff because of her sex
(RE 17-21); and that plaintiff's failure to become a partner
was due to any class based animus against women or to a

discriminatory motive or purpose. (RE 28.) The trial court
properly recognized at one point that in order to prevail
plaintiff had to prove that Price Waterhouse's treatment of
plaintiff was accompanied by a "discriminatory otive or
purpose." (RE 25.) Further, the court found that it could not

label any negative comments about plaintiff as being motivated
by an intent or purpose to treat her differently or to
discriminate. (Id.)

Price Waterhouse noted in its opening brief that
liability cannot be imposed under the disparate treatment
doctrine unless an intent to discriminate or an intent to treat

plaintiff differently is found. Plaintiff has responded by
citing cases involving the imposition of liability against
employers in circumstances where members of the workforce had
engaged in sexual harassment without the employer's direct
knowledge. In each of those cases, an intent to adversely
treat a female because of her sex is involved. The issue in

those cases is whether the intent to discriminate by a member
of the workforce will be attributed to the employer and whether
liability will be imposed upon the employer. In this case,
there is no finding of an intent to discriminate by any person
at Price Waterhouse. In short, there is no basis for invoking
the principles of the sexual harassment cases here.
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There being no intent to discriminate found by the
district court, the imposition of liability under the doctrine
of disparate treatment should be reversed.

VII.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in the Brief for

Appellee - Cross Appellant, Price Waterhouse submits that the
district court's decision must be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,
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Stephen E. Tallent
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